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Since the 1960s, at least three Muslim armed movements have sought to establish an
independent state in Mindanao, the traditional homeland of the Muslims in the southern
Philippines.1) In pursuit of this goal, the armed conflict in Mindanao has killed more than
a hundred thousand people and displaced millions of families from their homes since
1970.  The conflict has gone through cycles of armed struggle, international diplomacy,
mediation and peace negotiations but no definitive closure has been reached to date.
In this paper, I will first provide a brief background of the roots of the armed conflict
and the persistence of the Muslim separatist project.  I will next examine the viability of
the program and demands of the three major armed Muslim movements and the
responses by the government, taking into account the internationalization of the conflict.
I will then conclude by analyzing some policy alternatives for addressing the armed
conflict.
The Muslims in the Philippines: the Quest for the Bangsamoro Homeland2)
The Muslims comprise about five percent of the country’s total population and
constitute the majority in five out of the twenty three provinces in the southern Philippines
(Mindanao) where they are mostly concentrated.3) Islam took root in Mindanao some two
centuries before the coming of Christianity with the Spanish colonial conquest in the
fifteenth century.4) In pre-Hispanic Philippines, Islamic culture and religion radiated
from two centers of political power: the Sultanate in Sulu (1450 A.D.) and the Sultanate in
Maguindanao, central Mindanao (1511 A.D.).  Many of the key coastal trading centers in
central and northern Philippines, including Manila, already had Muslim rulers and the
Islamization of the country would have proceeded as a matter of course without the
Spanish conquest.
Through “divide and rule” tactics pursued through military attacks, cooptation, and
devious diplomacy, Spanish and later American colonial rule succeeded in putting an end
to the political power of the two Islamic sultanates.  Moreover, the Americans introduced
a system of electoral democracy which produced a new generation of elected Muslim
politicians from elite families.  However, in the national scheme of politics the Muslim
politicians played subordinate roles reflecting their far smaller political constituencies and
bases of power.
A confluence of the following factors provided the conditions for the emergence of the
armed separatist movements after the second world war: 1) the loss of traditional Muslim
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homelands to waves of local and foreign corporate incursions and government supported
Christian internal migrations to Mindanao; 2) economic backwardness of the Muslim
dominated provinces in relation to the rest of the country; 3) difficult access of Muslims to
government positions especially in the higher bureaucracies and career services; 4) the
leadership provided by a new generation of university educated Muslim intellectuals and
professionals in organizing the separatist movements; and 5) a vastly expanded network
of international linkages that have supported in varying ways the Muslim struggle for
autonomy or independence.  All of these would revive and strengthen the consciousness
of a cultural and religious identity increasingly seen as distinct from the majority Christian
population.
The Armed Separatist Movements: New Conditions, New Leaders
The decade of the sixties and seventies saw the emergence of the two major Muslim
armed movements, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded in 1969 and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977.  These decades marked the resurgence of
militant nationalism in the Philippines led by university students and intellectuals,
including many of the Muslim leaders who would figure prominently in the founding of
both the MNLF and the MILF.  Among the Muslim student and youth activists, three
events in particular served as the defining moments for the hastening of their
radicalization.  First there was the “Jabidah Massacre” in 1968 in which 180 persons,
mostly Muslims, who were being secretly trained by the Marcos administration to invade
and occupy Sabah were all killed when they refused to follow the order to attack.5)
Second, in response to this massacre of the mostly Muslim trainees, then governor of
Cotabato province, Datu Udtog Matalam, founded the Muslim Independence Movement
(MIM) which sought the creation of an independent state in Mindanao.6) The third
major event saw the mass killings of many Muslims in central Mindanao between
1970–1971 provoked by escalating economic, political and ethnic tensions between
Christian and Muslim communities.  Most of these attacks were perpetrated by
paramilitary gangs oftentimes organized by Christian local officials with the support of
factions of the military and police.  
The armed separatist Muslim movements that emerged during the sixties and the
seventies showed distinctive features.  The leaders were university educated or
professional Muslims in contrast with the older generation of Muslim leaders who were
usually elected politicians.  The two key leaders of this new generation were Nur Misuari
and Salamat Hashim.  Misuari was educated at the University of the Philippines and
served as an instructor of political science in the same university while Hashim studied at
Al-Azhar University in Cairo.  Both Misuari and Hashim co-founded the MNLF but
Hashim would later break away from the MNLF and led the founding of the MILF.  As
such these new generation of leaders took a different career path from the traditional
Muslim politicians but also had the appropriate social connections and skills to cultivate
necessary linkages with the older leaders and politicians.  For instance, the training of the
first generation of MNLF fighters, referred to as the “Top 90” which took place in Pulau
Pangkor, Perak, Malaysia was facilitated by the traditional Muslim politicians such as then
Congressman Rashid Lucman, ex-senator Salipada Pendatun and then Governor Datu
Udtog Matalam.7)
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Secondly, reflecting the internationalization of the armed struggle, these new leaders
were able to develop enduring political and organizational bonds with various Muslim
leaders and governments in the world.  The founding of the MNLF and the MILF
coincided with the resurgence of militant Islamic leaders and movements in the Muslim
world who were prepared to provide both political and military support to Islamic
struggles for independence in various parts of the world.  For instance, the MNLF was
granted special observer status as the official representative of the Moro people in the
Philippines by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the world’s largest
organization of Muslim states.  Among the OIC member states, Libya was a strong
supporter of the MNLF and together with Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) and Pakistan, provided training grounds and weapons.
Salamat Hashim, the founder of the MILF, was able to establish excellent international
connections with various radical Muslim leaders while based in Egypt and in the Middle
East for several years.  Hashim was also based in Pakistan between 1982 and 1987 and
was responsible for sending as many as five hundred Muslims for religious and military
training to the Afghan-Pakistan border.8) Many guerrillas from the MNLF and MILF
fought in the Afghanistan war against the Soviet occupation and in the process, forged
lifetime solidarity linkages with various Islamic leaders and militants from different parts
of the Muslim world.
Further reflecting the internationalization of the Muslim struggle, the third armed
Muslim group, the Abu Sayyaf, (Bearer or Father of the Sword in Arabic) was founded in
1991 by Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani.  He was a 1989–1990 alumnus of Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf ’s Afghan military academy and the name adopted by Janjalani’s group was in
honor of the Afghan institution’s founder.9) In one founding document, Janjalani claims
that the Abu Sayyaf was established to “serve as a bridge and balance between the
MILF and the MNLF” to counter charges that the group was another unwelcome faction
in the Muslim struggle.10) He also asserts that the group’s ultimate goal is the
“establishment of a purely Islamic government” and that the “... true and real objective of
humanity is the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the
noble Qur’an and purified sunnah.”  However, after the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in
1998, the Abu Sayyaf has become better known for its terrorist activities as it has engaged
in a number of spectacular cases of international kidnappings for ransom, ruthless
beheading of prisoners, indiscriminate bombings of public places and civilian targets, and
operational linkages with Jemaah Islamiyah.
The Political Project of the Armed Groups: Vision and Reality
The difficulty of pursuing the political project of an independent Muslim homeland is
dramatized by current demographic and political realities in the southern Philippines
today.  One hundred years ago, the Muslim population constituted about seventy six
percent of Mindanao’s total population.  Today, it is down to only about twenty percent
of the current population as a result of policies of internal Christian migration, corporate
expansion, land grabbings and seizures, and family displacements from the armed
conflict.  Moreover, the Muslims are now in the majority in only five of the twenty three
provinces in the southern Philippines (Sulu, 98%; Lanao del Sur, 93%; Tawi-Tawi, 92%;
Basilan, 80%; and Maguindanao, 64 %).11) In addition, these Muslim-dominated provinces
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do not constitute a single contiguous area and also represent various ethnic-linguistic
groupings within the Muslim community with their own histories of differences and
rivalries.  For instance, part of the differences between the MNLF under Misuari and the
Hashim-led MILF has to do with the different ethno-linguistic political bases of each
movement.  Thus, the Misuari-MNLF forces are strongest among the Tausug-Sama
communities of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi while the MILF draws its support mainly from the
Maguindanaons and Maranaos.  
A potent basis for the region’s long history of resistance and resentment against the
central government has been the economic marginalization of the Muslim-dominated
provinces.  As a region, the ARMM is the poorest in the country and its five constituent
provinces are also the poorest both in Mindanao and in the whole country.  In 2000,
the incidence of poverty in ARMM was almost twice that for the country as a whole,
with about sixty three percent of the population in the region considered to be poor
compared with thirty four percent for the country as a whole.12) In terms of human
development indicators which combine measures for income, health and education, the
ARMM provinces also have the lowest rankings among all provinces in the country
(see Table 1).
In pursuing its project of an independent Bangsamoro, the MNLF under Misuari
stressed the geographic boundaries of the pre-colonial, traditional Moro homelands as
the territorial base of this proposed entity which, however, now comprises mostly
Christian dominated provinces.  In recognition of this reality, Misuari therefore uses
the concept of Bangsamoro to include the Muslims, Christians, and the indigenous high-
landers in this area.  To show that this political project is not only for Muslims, the
MNLF has also sought the support of non-Muslim personalities and groups, particular-
ly those who resent the political and economic marginalization of Mindanao by the
Manila-based central government.  In contrast, the MILF has officially sought a more
Islamic identity for its movement with Islam as its official ideology.  Thus, one of the
main charges of Hashim against Misuari when he led his supporters to break away
from the MNLF was that the leadership was being “manipulated away [by Misuari]
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Table 1: Poverty Incidence and Human Development Rankings
Poverty Incidence % Human Development Index 
Year 2000 (HDI) Provincial Rank*
Philippines 27.5
Metro Manila 5.6
Sulu 92.0 77
Tawi-Tawi 75.3 76
Basilan 63.0 75
Lanao del Sur 48.1 74
Maguindanao 36.2 73
* HDI Rankings for the country’s total of 77 provinces with a rank of 1 showing the
most desirable outcome.  Source: Philippine Human Development Report 2002.
from Islamic bases, methodologies and objectives, and was fast evolving towards a
Marxist-Maoist orientation.” 13)
It is true that Misuari comes from a more secular educational background with his
studies at the country’s premier state university and his active involvement in Marxist-
oriented nationalist groups in the 1960s.  However, it appears that the problems that
eventually led to the breakaway of Hashim’s group had more to do with charges about
Misuari’s personalistic and authoritarian style of leadership.  It is also true that the MILF
under Hashim is more self-consciously Islamic in its orientation but in practice it has also
proven to be pragmatic in its politics.  For instance, there are reports that the MILF has
tactical working arrangements with the communist guerrillas in some Mindanao battle
fronts.  At the same time, the MILF, or at least some of its local commands, and the Abu
Sayyaf have also linked up with various fighters of the Jemaah Islamiyah, the regional
network of militant Muslim activists associated with Al-Qaeda.14)
Political Negotiations between the Government and the Muslim Movements
The original negotiating document for the peace process in the Southern Philippines
goes back to the Tripoli agreement signed on December 23, 1976, between the
government and the MNLF with the participation of the OIC and with Libyan leader
Muammar Qadaffi playing the critical role.  The most significant provision of the
agreement sought the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines comprising
thirteen provinces.  This agreement represented a major departure from the MNLF’s
original goal of an independent Bangsamoro to one of autonomy within Philippine
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  However, Marcos unilaterally implemented the
agreement by creating two regional autonomous provinces comprising only three
provinces out of the originally mandated thirteen provinces.  Both the MNLF and the
OIC strongly protested this move and in fact resulted in the OIC’s recognition of the
MNLF as the “legitimate representative of the Muslim movement” in Southern
Philippines and also granted it observer status.  No further formal negotiations between
the government and the MNLF took place till the ouster of Marcos in 1986 by a military
mutiny and civilian uprising.
The Aquino administration that assumed power after the ouster of Marcos sought to
address the Muslim struggle in Mindanao by creating an Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) through an organic act passed by Congress.  In August 1989, the
Organic Act for the ARMM, Republic Act 6734, was passed but in the plebiscite that
followed only four (Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao) out of the thirteen
provinces voted to join the ARMM.  In a later plebiscite in 2001, under the amended
Organic Act one other province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi City) joined the ARMM.
The MNLF boycotted all electoral exercises associated with the ARMM until 1996,
arguing that the Tripoli Agreement mandating the creation of an autonomous region with
13 provinces be implemented.
Twenty years after the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the government and the MNLF
finally succeeded in negotiating a peace accord in 1996 through the mediation of the OIC
with Libya and Indonesia playing the major roles.  Under strong pressure from the OIC
and Indonesia, Misuari and the MNLF agreed to accept the autonomy framework under
the ARMM.  Supported by the Ramos administration, Misuari subsequently was elected
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as ARMM governor in 1996.  However, Misuari’s record as ARMM governor proved to
be unimpressive.  Facing severe budgetary constraints, lack of management skills, and
corruption, Misuari failed to provide a credible leadership.  He is now under detention in
Manila facing charges of treason and rebellion when he led an abortive uprising against
the government in 2001.  Since 2001, the MNLF has also broken up into at least two
factions: a pro-government group led by the so-called Council of 15 that took power in
the ARMM in the elections after the abortive uprising by Misuari, and the loyalists of
Misuari rooted mainly in the island provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.  The Misuari
loyalists figured in fierce armed clashes with government forces in the Sulu islands in
February 2005, provoked by the killing of an unarmed Muslim family by government
military units operating against the Abu Sayyaf in the same area.
Meanwhile, the MILF refused to recognize the ARMM and participate in its electoral
exercises, focusing instead on building up its political and military strength.  As claimed
by one leading MILF cadre, the ARMM is a “total failure because it does not provide
genuine autonomy and led to the disintegration of the MNLF.”15) Not as beholden to the
OIC as the MNLF, the MILF has been able to exercise a greater degree of independence
and flexibility from this body while welcoming the OIC’s concern with the situation in
Mindanao.  In 2000, the Estrada administration ordered an all-out war against the various
military camps of the MILF, displacing in the process close to a million people.  The new
administration of Pres.  Arroyo succeeded in restarting negotiations with the MILF with
the signing of an agreement on March 24, 2001, to resume peace talks.  After a ceasefire
was agreed upon, Libya and later Malaysia facilitated a new round of peace talks between
the government and the MILF.  A monitoring force composed of personnel from
Malaysia, Brunei and Libya was sent to the Philippines to oversee the ceasefire and
formal peace talks hosted by Malaysia resumed in April 2005.  The talks focus on three
main substantive agenda: 1) security aspects relating to the cessation of hostilities and its
implementing guidelines; 2) relief and rehabilitation of the conflict areas by accessing both
local and international resources; and 3) ancestral domain claims.  The ancestral domain
claims is an extremely contentious issue since it would require reconciling conflicting
traditions and practices on land ownership among Muslims, Christians, and the lumads
(indigenous tribes living in various Mindanao provinces) and the historic claims to the
Bangsamoro homeland.
The participation of Malaysia in a facilitator-mediator role is a major political
opportunity in the negotiations because like the OIC in the GRP-MNLF talks, Malaysia
has also strongly counseled the MILF to drop its secessionist project and work within the
purview of Philippine law and government.16) Malaysia has material and political
resources to influence the outcome of the talks.  However, the MILF is also wary about
too much reliance on OIC mediation in light of what it considers to be the failed outcome
of the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement in 1996.  In the process of preparing for the
substantive peace negotiations in Malaysia, the MILF convened a three-day consultation
assembly in June 2005 with tens of thousands of its mass supporters from all over
Mindanao, an extraordinary event participated in by diplomats from the OIC, World
Bank officials, and Philippine government representatives.  This was an astute political
move by the MILF to legitimize openly before its mass supporters its agenda of
negotiations with the government as well as signal its readiness to activate international
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support from both Islamic and non-Islamic sources.  
American Intervention
In the aftermath of 9/11, American intervention in the heartland of Muslim Mindanao
has introduced a new dimension to the armed conflict and peace process.  The MILF and
the Abu Sayyaf have been charged of coddling Islamic terrorists supposedly linked to
Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaida network through the Jemaah Islamiyah.  While admitting that
all kinds of Islamic visitors had access to its various camps in the past, the MILF denies
any formal operational linkages with terrorists.  In pursuit of its campaign against Islamic
radical groups, the U.S. has provided counter-terrorist training and intelligence and
increased substantially its military financial assistance to the Philippine military.  In
2005, US foreign military financing for the Philippines almost doubled from US $30
million to US $55 million.  The U.S. has also provided official development assistance to
Mindanao and specifically allocated US $30 million to the MILF conflict-ridden areas.
However, the United States reallocated this development fund in mid-year 2004 to other
areas, charging the government and the MILF of not making enough progress in their
peace negotiations.17)
While increased American financial military assistance and training can help upgrade
the Philippine military’s poor resources and capabilities, this also risks undermining and
derailing the country’s protracted search for a political solution to the armed conflict with
both the Muslim movements and the Communist guerrillas.18) There are at least three
pitfalls to American intervention in the internal armed conflict.  First, it inflates the
Philippine military’s sense of power and confidence that the armed conflict could be
defeated mainly by military means.  Secondly, it polarizes public responses since
American intervention has always served as a flashpoint for militant nationalist
mobilizations.  And finally, American intervention subsumes the local armed conflicts to
the greater strategic interests of current U.S. policy in its war against terrorism, glossing
over in the process the nuances and particularities of local movements long rooted in
legitimate grievances.  In the ongoing peace talks between the government and the
MILF as facilitated by Malaysia, all the parties have so far avoided any direct participation
by the United States even while the MILF has welcomed development assistance for the
conflict-ridden areas from all quarters.  
Conclusion
The Muslim struggle in the country has reached a critical stage where a viable and
acceptable alternative to outright independence and separatism will have to be decisively
fleshed out.  Given the unsatisfactory outcome of negotiations between the government
and the MNLF and the many limitations of the current ARMM framework, what is the
alternative?  The way out is not to abandon the concept and practice of regional
autonomy but to expand and deepen it whether in the framework of a shift to a formal
federal system or a radical amendment of the existing organic act that created the
ARMM.  
A new concept and substantial practice of regional autonomy for the ARMM will have
to address two key concerns: First, an innovative political leadership that is able to
bridge and transcend the competing legitimacy claims of traditional Islamic leaders,
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revolutionary leaders nurtured by the armed struggle, and politicians with electoral
mandates.  Secondly, the regional government must have full financial and budgetary
autonomy.  
The elected leadership of the ARMM government continues to face enormous political
and financial constraints.  As shown by the experience of past elected ARMM officials
including that of Misuari, the regional government continues to be hobbled by limited
budgetary allocations and the lack of support by the armed movements and their
followers as well as elected local government officials who have their own independent
bases of political and economic power.  For instance, the Local Government Code of
1991 provides local government units with significantly increased shares of the national
internal revenue allocations and enhanced taxation powers vesting them with greater
financial autonomy compared with the ARMM government whose finances are largely
controlled by the national government.  
A World Bank-funded assessment of governance problems in the ARMM stresses
this lack of financial autonomy thus: 
“... although autonomous in name and in legal status, the ARMM regional
government has almost no independent source of income and has little flexibility in
budget management.  It depends hugely on the National Government for financing of
significant devolved responsibilities, including human development.  In contrast,
LGUs (local government units) in the region enjoy fiscal autonomy in management of
their IRAs (Internal Revenue Allocations) ..., but have few mandated responsibilities
for the human development sectors.” 19)
In turn, the ARMM’s dearth of financial and human resources has also severely
deterred its ability to realize the mandates provided by the current organic act for the
significant practice of Islamic laws and values as shown in the creation of Islamic (shari’a)
courts at different levels and the full recognition and creation of madaris (Islamic religious
schools).  Many of the shari’a courts as mandated by law cannot be established and
those actually existing courts lack judges.20) On the other hand, the overwhelming
majority of the traditional Islamic religious schools (madaris ) remain as poor institutions
with little resources and competence for combining the teaching of Islamic religious
values and the secular subjects and skills required to succeed in the broader society.
Current proposals for a shift to a federal system will therefore have to contend with the
need for special arrangements such as an asymmetric federalism for regions like that of
Muslim Mindanao.21)
Notes:
1) The roots of the Muslim armed struggle to protect their original homelands date back to the anti-
colonial resistance against Spanish and American colonial rule.  This paper focuses on the developments
since the 1960s.  
2) The concept and vision of a Bangsamoro was popularized by Nur Misuari, the founding chair of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF).  The term “Moro” was originally used by the Spaniards to refer to the
local Muslim population in the Philippines.  In its colonial and post-colonial usage, it was a term of
derision but the MNLF appropriated and elevated it as a badge of honor and identity marker for the local
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